Posted by
G Murphy Donovan on Wednesday, January 20, 2010 8:31:44 PM
A
number of national security problems were on display over the holidays. At
Thanksgiving, at least three uninvited guests cracked a Secret Service barrier
and crashed a party at the White House. The intruders remained undetected until
the next day.
A
week before Christmas, the Director of National Intelligence, Dennis Blair,
attempted to reassure the nation with an editorial celebrating the 5th
anniversary of the Intelligence Reform and Prevention Act: "Our nation is becoming ‘safer
every day’ (sic) because we are aware that information increases in power only
when it is shared."
Several
days later an Islamic suicide bomber nearly blew an Airbus out of the sky over Detroit, not because we didn’t know about the threat, but
because the “sharing” of which Dennis Blair spoke, failed abysmally. Then on 30
December, an al Qaeda double agent
infiltrated a secret CIA meeting in Afghanistan and blew himself up, taking
seven American intelligence officers with him.
To
all of these operational blunders the responses have been either; unsupportable
reassurances or implausible silver bullets.
Janet
Napolitano, Director of Homeland Security, was the first to assume a defensive
crouch on 28 December, claiming
“The system worked (sic)” after the aviation near miss.
Napolitano
was followed by Dennis Blair on 7
January:
"While the December 25 attempt exposed improvement needs
and flaws in coordination, it ‘did not expose weakness’ (sic) in the concepts
of intelligence reform or suggest that its progress should be redirected. The
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) and the progress of
the past five years will continue to guide our future improvements."
Not to be outdone in the
rationalization sweeps, CIA Director, Leon Panetta,
took to the pages of the Washington Post
on 10 January complaining: "We have found no consolation, however, in public
commentary suggesting that those who gave their lives (in Afghanistan)
somehow brought it upon themselves because of poor tradecraft."
All
of the apologetics were quickly followed by several rounds of silver bullets,
the most ludicrous of which were ‘full body’ scanners.
To be effective, such devices would have to be installed in every airport in
the world; and even then, scanners would not be able to detect explosives
secreted in body cavities.
All
the smoke and mirrors deployed in the wake of the holiday security follies
obscured an ever widening schism within the Intelligence Community; a growing analytical
divide between a politicized group of Beltway threat minimalists which includes
Blair, Napolitano, and Panetta and several Military Intelligence realists which
include Major General Mike Flynn, chief of Intelligence for the International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Lieutenant General Dave Deptula, chief of
USAF Intelligence.
Flynn fired a shot across the complacency
bow on 4 January with an intelligence report that was published by the Center
for a New American Security. The unusual venue for Flynn’s assessment was
probably an attempt to insure that his report did not suffer the fate of a similar
report
from General McChrystal six months earlier. McChrystal’s summer candor was the
source of the great “dithering” debate over Afghanistan troop augmentation.
Echoing McChrystal’s earlier admonition, Flynn again spelled out a grim
warning:
"Our senior leaders - the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, Congress, the President
of the United States - are not getting the right information to make decisions
with ... The media is driving the issues. We need to build a process from
the sensor all the way to the political decision makers."
In
an email
of 9 December, General Deptula exhibited similar candor in his assessment of
the homeland miasma:
" The number one cause of civilian
casualties in Afghanistan
is the Taliban — not air power. Human Rights Watch has verified
that the Taliban kills three to four times more civilians than ISAF air and
ground forces combined. More often than not, these deaths are deliberate….It is
curious that it appears there is more ink spent on casualties from air attacks
than there is on the criminality and violation of the ethical tenets of ‘Islam’
(sic) that occurs daily as a result of Taliban actions."
General
Deptula’s bluntness is a beacon of clarity in an administration that seems to have
stricken the words Islam, Muslim, or enemy from the strategic vocabulary.
Deptula may work out of the E Ring at the Pentagon, but this former fighter
pilot surely speaks for every American serviceman in two theaters of war - Islamists,
not American GI’s, are the threat.
A
close reading of both generals reveals a clear signal from the field. Military Intelligence is trying to convey a
realistic sense of threat and urgency to a national Intelligence establishment
that appears to be tone deaf.
Political
operatives like Blair, Napolitano, and Panetta have the White House ear, yet
none of these, including the President, have any experience with Intelligence
or threat analysis. As a group, all four
seem to be more concerned with Muslim cultural sensitivities than they are with
dangers to deployed troops or national security.
Napolitano
and Panetta are lawyers by profession, but they made their bones as politicians.
Panetta’s national security vita is mostly tenure; nine terms in the House of
Representatives. Napolitano, devoid of any national experience, was picked to
head the Homeland Security Department as payback for being an early Obama supporter
before the last presidential election. Blair is a retired military officer with
a distinguished naval career. His preeminent qualification for the top Intelligence
job seems to be reliability.
The
politicization of national Intelligence and national estimates has been
metastasizing since the Clinton
era. George Tenant, former Director of CIA, and Colin Powell, former Secretary of State, might be modern icons
for the problem.
In the run up to the second Iraq War, they perfected wet finger analysis and
redefined objective assessments as the ability to tell either political party
what they wanted to hear.
Yet at this late date, we are still told by Mr. Blair that there is no need to change the vector
of Intelligence “reform.” If this is true then those forthright Military Intelligence
officers who are expressing concern about the threat and safety of troops in
the field may be in for a bumpy ride. The analytical divide between the
tactical commanders at the front and the Beltway salons in Washington is growing daily. One pundit
captured the dilemma; the problem isn’t “incompetence but incomprehension.”
Indeed, we can not defeat threats that we refuse to recognize.